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Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence supporting the view that constitutions are the 
primary and fundamental institutional determinant of entrepreneurship. It shows that some of the 
provisions contained in national constitutions are positively and significantly associated to a 
standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics, namely the rate of new business density. Using for 
115 countries a novel dataset containing the characteristics of the constitutions enacted in the world, 
applying an IV-GMM treatment to deal with the endogeneity of constitutional rules, and controlling 
for de facto variables, the paper finds that provisions about the right to conduct/establish a business, 
the right to strike, consumer protection, anti-corruption, and compulsory education promote higher 
rates of new firm formation. Contrasting results are instead obtained for provisions concerning 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically some countries are characterized by a greater endowment of entrepreneurship 
capital that results in persistently high rates of new firm formation. This characteristic of a country 
might be linked to the widespread presence of individuals who come up with new ideas and put 
them into practice (Baumol, 2010), to the specialization in industries where the minimum efficient 
scale level of output is smaller (Acs and Audretsch, 1993), or to the availability of opportunities 
(Kirzner, 1973) and knowledge spillovers (Acs et al., 2009). But there is also the possibility that the 
pillars of the legal and institutional systems designed in a country’s constitution create a setting 
more or less favorable to the undertaking of entrepreneurial ventures. For example, the principles 
introduced by America’s Founders at the Constitutional Convention sessions in 1787 to protect 
property rights and free markets clearly contributed to promote the conditions for the 
entrepreneurial dynamism lately witnessed by de Tocqueville in On Democracy in America 
(Chapter XIX): “What astonishes me in the United States is not so much the marvelous grandeur of 
some undertakings as the innumerable multitude of small ones”.1 
This paper studies the effect of a number of institutional principles - ranging from provisions 
for a counter corruption commission to the enforcement of economic rights, from the adoption of 
economic plans to the protection of the environment, from the national integration of ethnic 
communities to education - stated in the constitutional texts of 115 countries on the rate of 
entrepreneurship over the 2004-2013 period (the list of countries is reported in Appendix A.1). 
Some of these principles are among those most commonly associated to a higher propensity by 
individuals to start up a firm. Constitutions typically represent the highest, direct source of law. 
They regulate the relationship between government agencies and bodies and the citizenry. They also 
state the fundamentals rights a polity is willing to protect. The rules and the principles stated in a 
constitution are stable and the protection granted to rights strong. Requirements to amend a 
constitution are generally strict (supermajorities, special legal procedures), which reduces 
legislative discretion and makes change very onerous. That is why it is particularly interesting to 
study the impact of constitutional rules on the economic system. Knowing which principles foster 
development and growth can help countries to avoid mistakes that might be very costly. 
Furthermore, because of the particular status of the rights included in a constitution, the impact on 
economic variables is likely to be remarkable and it is important to identify it in a precise and 
complete manner.
2
  
                                                          
1
 Cf. Larson and Winship (2005). 
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 Kelsen (1967) identifies in constitutions a source of 'higher' norms authorizing the creation of further 'lower' 
norms and statutes, hierarchically subordinate and that cannot oppose the higher, constitutional norms. 
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However, even if a country includes a given principle or right in its own constitution it 
might accord it different strength. Rights in a constitution might be “justiciable”, meaning that they 
can be decided by a court or, in a nutshell, be legally enforceable. This is clearly the highest level of 
protection that can be granted to a right. On the other hand, rights can be simply “aspirational”, 
which leaves little ground for their actual enforcement. This implies that the presence of a given 
principle or the fact that a given right is mentioned in a constitution does not imply that it is 
implemented de facto. 
In order to control for the actual implementation of constitutional principles, besides 
considering the characteristics of constitutions and some general features of the countries, we also 
take into account additional country-specific factors, which are likely to influence firm 
demographics, our aim being to compare the impact exerted on the rate of entrepreneurship by de 
jure (constitutional variables) and de facto characteristics of countries’ legal systems, where de 
facto variables proxy the actual state of affairs regarding either a single constitutional principle or a 
homogeneous group of them.
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Main findings show that: provisions dealing with the right to conduct/establish a business, 
the right to strike, consumer protection, presence of a counter-corruption commission, and 
compulsory education promote higher rates of new firm formation; provisions about economic 
planning and protection of the environment constrain new firm formation; and provisions 
concerning protection of intellectual property rights lead to ambiguous results. Since the Breusch-
Pagan’s test, the Wooldridge test and the Sargan test suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
serial correlation and endogeneity in our data, we use a GMM treatment and adopt an instrumental 
variable estimation. 
Particularly, institutions are endogenous and the direction of causality needs to be 
established carefully. On the one hand, countries endowed with institutions that favor economic 
activity result in higher entrepreneurial initiative. On the other hand, when a country is 
characterized by a high level of entrepreneurial capital, it is also more likely to develop institutions 
that favor entrepreneurship. 
We instrument endogenous institutional variables using mortality rates in countries 
colonized by Europeans, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and geographic characteristics like the 
distance from the equator and the trade share of an economy. Such instruments, on top of being 
supported by sound economic arguments, are also relevant since they are strongly correlated with 
endogenous institutions but not correlated with the error term. 
                                                          
3
 For a related study using both de jure and de facto variables see Feld and Voigt (2003). 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature, with special 
reference to the contributions dealing with the impact of constitutions on national economies. 
Section 3 presents the main research hypotheses and theoretical explanations. Section 4 describes 
the dataset and the empirical strategy. Section 5 illustrates the estimation model and the 
econometric strategy. Section 6 discusses the main findings. Section 7 contains the results of a 
robustness analysis performed to help diagnose misspecifications. Finally, Section 8 concludes with 
some suggestions for possible revisions/design of new constitutional texts and directions for future 
research. 
 
2. Related Literature  
According to Melton et al. (2013), the design features of constitutions, from their level of 
specificity to the number of rights enumerated and the clarity of their text, do matter in shaping the 
patterns of institutional development exhibited by different countries at different times.  
In-depth analysis of the link between economic performance and constitutions dates back to 
the public choice literature analyzing the impact of different constitutional settings on the size of 
government, welfare expenditure and generally on the composition of public expenditure (see 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, and, for a general overview, Mueller, 
2003 and Voigt, 1999). 
The work of the aforementioned scholars is however theoretical in nature. Until the early 
2000s, very little empirical work had been done to discover the causal links between the 
constitutional characteristics of a country and its economic performance. This gap in the literature 
was filled by Persson and Tabellini (2003 and 2006). They analyze the impact that the form of 
government (defined as presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system) and the electoral 
rule (majoritarian versus proportional) have on several economic variables dealing with fiscal 
policy, rent extraction by the government (perceived corruption and grafts) and economic 
productivity of the country (measured by labor and total factor productivity). They find that 
presidential systems and majoritarian electoral rules result in much lower government expenditure 
than parliamentary and proportional systems. Furthermore, public expenditure is definitely lower 
for presidential majoritarian systems than for parliamentary proportional ones. Finally, 
democratization promotes growth, especially when it goes hand in hand with economic 
liberalization. 
Blume et al. (2009a and 2009b) extend Persson and Tabellini’s study to a larger number of 
countries and to direct democracies. They confirm Persson and Tabellini’s results partially. In their 
estimates, the impact of presidential systems on economic and fiscal indicators is definitely weaker, 
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whereas electoral rules generally maintain their effect. Moreover, direct democratic institutions 
influence fiscal policy and government efficiency.  
Parker (2007) deals with the relationship between entrepreneurship and the law. He argues 
that the law influences organizational forms in entrepreneurship. For instance, high legal costs 
might foster entrepreneurship in the form of self-employment. Legal constraints like non-
distribution of surplus, often matched to tax breaks favor social enterprises. 
In this paper we deal with the impact of constitutions on entrepreneurship and, particularly, 
on the rate of new business formation.
4
 The closest previous study is Zhang (2012), who analyzes 
empirically the link between institutional characteristics of a country, rent seeking and 
entrepreneurship. 
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the link between entrepreneurship and 
the development of the justice system (Quintin, 2008 and Visaria, 2009). 
Judicial efficiency has a strong and statistically significant impact on the entry rate of new 
firms and on GDP (Chemin, 2009), while facilitating access to finance, reducing contract breach 
and fostering investments (Chemin, 2012). Higher judicial efficacy has a positive impact on the 
entry of new firms, while it leaves the exit rate unaltered (Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 
2015). In a study on Brazilian data, Lichand and Soares (2014) find that better access to justice 
affects entrepreneurship positively among individuals with higher level of education but not among 
those with lower educational levels. Since education is a proxy for wealth, their result seems to 
indicate that judicial change in Brazil pushed wealthier individuals towards entrepreneurial 
activities. 
Desai et al. (2005) show that all institutional factors that affect credit markets have a 
significant impact on entrepreneurship in the emerging markets but not in the mature countries of 
Europe. More generally, regulatory burdens have a significant negative impact on economic activity 
(Djankov et al., 2002; van Stel et al., 2007 and Braunerhjelm et al., 2015). Particularly, product 
market regulations, hiring and firing costs, heavy regulations on entrepreneurial activity have a 
significant, negative impact on the entry of new small firms and, more generally, on firms’ 
productivity (Scarpetta et al., 2002). A similar effect has working time regulations (Stephen et al., 
2009).
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Corruption and a low endowment of moral awareness do not necessarily affect the rate of 
new firm formation, but rather shape the way entrepreneurial activities are carried out. This finding 
                                                          
4
 The ratio of new business formation is just one of the possible variables that can be employed to measure 
entrepreneurship. For an explanation of the trade-off between alternative measures and for the reason why we chose to 
employ this particular measure in this paper, see Section 4.1 below. 
5
 On regulation, firm dynamics and entrepreneurship see the Symposium published in 2015 in the European 
Journal of Law and Economics, volume 40, issue 1. 
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is obtained looking at the impact of the control of corruption on entrepreneurial activity (Anokhin 
and Schulze, 2009), at the moral awareness of entrepreneurs (Bryant, 2009), and at the influence 
exerted by inefficient financial and legal institutions and by weak enforcement on the likelihood of 
entrepreneurs to engage in corruption (Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
3. The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Effects of Constitutions on Entrepreneurship 
Several factors affect the dynamics of entrepreneurship according to the literature. We have 
chosen aspects of constitutions that directly affect the main variables the literature on 
entrepreneurship has indicated as highly significant for the development of entrepreneurial firms in 
an economy. We test the impact of a set of institutional variables that define the economic 
environment of a country. Particularly, we take into account provisions regarding education, the 
consideration and protection of ethnic diversity, the protection of economic rights, and the 
protection of the environment. 
The relationship between education and entrepreneurship has been studied with special 
attention to the link between human capital and individual entrepreneurs’ earnings. This literature is 
linked to the endogenous growth literature, stressing how investments in human capital, innovation 
and, more generally, knowledge, foster economic growth.
6
 Several studies estimate the rate of 
return for entrepreneurs of an extra year of education but the conclusions of these studies often 
diverge. According to some theories, more education has no impact on entrepreneurial earning or, 
in the worst case, depresses it. Other theories instead claim a positive relationship between 
education and earnings. 
There is a general, anecdotal belief that too much education jeopardizes entrepreneurial 
creativity. Very successful entrepreneurs often dropped out of college or even of high school 
(Parker, 2009). The more you study, the story goes, the more you learn rigid mental schemes and 
rational arguments that suffocate your creative skill.  
Signaling theory provides yet another explanation why entrepreneurs might get less 
education than employees. In a world of asymmetric information where abilities are private 
information, perspective employees try to signal their quality in the job market by acquiring more 
education (Spence, 1973). Given that entrepreneurs do not need signaling since they do not seek a 
potential employer but are self-employed, they have little incentives to invest in the formation of 
their human capital (Riley, 1979).  These theories however explain why prospective entrepreneurs 
tend to invest little in education; they do not explain why education might have a low impact on 
entrepreneurs’ earnings. Orzach and Tauman (2005) elaborate on signaling theories, presenting a 
                                                          
6
For a general and complete overview of endogenous growth theories see Aghion and Howitt (1997). 
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model in which individual ability is two-dimensional: on the one hand there is the human capital 
derived from education and on the other hand there is entrepreneurial talent. While the former is 
publicly observable, the latter is private information. People highly gifted in entrepreneurial talent 
signal such characteristic by investing little in education, thus somehow “committing” themselves 
not to look for a job as employees. This would be a losing strategy for untalented individuals. 
Therefore it represents a good signal to lenders. By gaining a preferential lane in the credit market, 
given their talent, these entrepreneurs have high chances of success and therefore high earnings.  
According to these theories, we should expect that public investment in education has little 
if no impact on entrepreneurship. In any case, such impact should be negative. Particularly, in an 
occupational choice model, if education has low returns to entrepreneurship, we should find that 
education and de jure and de facto provisions about it impact negatively the rate of new business 
formation. 
Other theories suggest a positive relationship between education and entrepreneurial 
earnings. Some studies argue that entrepreneurs too are screened by lenders, customers, etc. 
Therefore, in an adverse selection environment, they have possibly as much incentive to invest in 
education as employees (Parker and van Praag, 2006). Moreover, formal education might enhance 
the productivity of the self-employed, as well as that of employees (van Praag, 2005).     
What are the predictions of empirical analysis? There seems to be a generally positive 
relationship between education and earnings from entrepreneurship, particularly when the 
endogeneity of educational choice is taken into account and an instrumental variables approach is 
taken. The impact of education is higher in developed countries than in developing ones. Moreover, 
on average, there seems to be the same return to education for the self-employed and for employees 
(see Parker 2009 and other studies reported therein). In line with such empirical evidence about the 
impact of education on entrepreneurship, we formulate the following hypothesis. Particularly, we 
consider two characteristics of constitutions related to education, namely, whether the constitution 
guarantees equal access to higher education and to what level (or year of age) the constitution 
makes education compulsory. 
H1: The presence of special provisions regarding equal access and compulsory 
education in a country’s constitution exerts a positive impact on the rate of new business 
formation.  
The presence of ethnic minorities in a country and immigration has been a highly debated 
issue in the literature on entrepreneurship. A first, important question is whether the presence of 
various ethnicities has a positive impact on entrepreneurship. Some studies have pointed out 
positive and negative effects of the coexistence of different ethnicities on entrepreneurship (See 
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Parker, 2009). Generally, there is evidence that members of ethnic minority groups are subject to 
discrimination in paid employment, in the market for capital and in the product market. The first 
and the last types of discrimination would typically encourage entrepreneurship, whereas the last 
would impede it. Empirical studies find mixed evidence about the sign of the impact of 
discrimination on ethnic entrepreneurship, possibly showing that all these factors are at play and 
counteract each other. Discrimination in paid employment increases the attractiveness of self-
employment for members of the minority group. Similarly, the presence of discrimination in the 
product market may facilitate self-employment within minorities. Ethnic groups may constitute 
enclaves in which individuals support each other economically. Within such enclaves, there might 
be protected niche markets catering for special needs like special clothing and food, religious goods 
and services. Entrepreneurs belonging to the specific ethnic group are likely to have better capacity 
to cater for such special needs. Clearly, discrimination in the capital market hits negatively on 
entrepreneurship (although it may favor the establishment of banks and other financial institutions 
founded by members of the discriminated group). 
In theory, if the legal system of a country contains special provisions concerning the 
integration of ethnic minorities, such provisions would probably have the effect of reducing 
discrimination. As a result we could expect a positive impact on entrepreneurship if the negative 
effects of discrimination on entrepreneurship were predominant and a negative impact otherwise. 
As the negative elements seem to be predominant in importance and number (since capital market 
discrimination substantially reduce the opportunities to develop large firms and the positive effects 
from product market discrimination are likely to be small) we formulate the following hypothesis. 
H2: The presence of constitutional provisions aiming at reducing ethnic 
fractionalization positively impacts on new business formation. 
We then study the impact of two institutional characteristics that are likely to impact the rate 
of formation of new businesses heavily and negatively. 
We first consider whether the constitution mentions the adoption of national economic 
plans. In a planned economy, private initiative has very little space to develop, which is likely to 
jeopardize entrepreneurial spirit. 
H3: If a constitution mentions the adoption of national economic plans, the rate of new 
business formation is reduced. 
We then consider whether a constitution explicitly refers to the protection and preservation 
of the environment. This is likely to result in the adoption of regulations constraining the behavior 
of firms, specifically requiring them to adopt costly procedures to avoid pollution. Such procedures 
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are generally characterized by economies of scale and therefore impact negatively on the 
profitability of small firms in particular. 
H4: If a constitution explicitly mentions environmental concerns, the rate of new 
business formation is reduced. 
Finally, we consider a group of variables classified in the dataset under the heading 
“Economic Rights”. In this group, we find variables of different nature. The characteristic they 
share is their direct relationship with institutional aspects that are intrinsically connected to specific 
economic rights. 
We include variables related to property rights and their use. In this subgroup we find 
variables like the presence of constitutional provisions for the right to transfer property freely inter 
vivos and the right to inherit.  To our knowledge, we are the first to study the relationship between 
these characteristics of property rights and entrepreneurship. Our interest in these variables can be 
motivated as follows. 
The right to transfer property freely inter vivos is a proxy for the existence of a secondary 
market for enterprises. In this respect, the presence of such legal provision represents a form of 
insurance for prospective entrepreneurs willing to invest in a new business venture. It also 
represents an institutional setting in which the value of an entrepreneurial venture can be 
established. A very successful enterprise can be transferred to new owners for a high price with low 
transaction costs, whereas some value can be extracted from an unsuccessful one, be that only the 
value of the assets sold separately. In either case, the existence of such right is deemed to have a 
positive effect on entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, the possibility to inherit implies the ability for people not belonging to the 
entrepreneur’s family of origin to obtain the control of the business. This should guarantee the best 
use of economic resources, enhancing the value of the firm, with consequent positive effects on the 
rate of return on the entrepreneur’s investment and an increase in the rate of formation of new 
businesses. 
H5: If a constitution establishes clear norms to transfer property pre and post mortem, 
the rate of formation of new businesses increases. 
The protection of intellectual property rights is another factor of utmost importance for the 
formation and development of new firms. Particularly, the literature has stressed the role played by 
patents. In this paper, we also include trademarks and copyright. For this purpose, we develop a 
cumulative measure of intellectual property rights consisting of patent, copyright, and trademark. 
Patents play an ambiguous role on the development of entrepreneurship. On the one hand, 
they have a positive value, in that they guarantee the just remuneration of R&D investment. This 
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fosters the establishment of new start-ups and of new small, highly technological firms (Spulber, 
2014). It is in fact widely recognized that many radical innovations come from new start-ups 
(Zucker et al, 1998; Jorgenson, 2001). As a result, the rate of new firm formation should be 
positively impacted. On the other hand, however, a country with a strong protection of intellectual 
property is likely to be a mature country, relatively close to the technological frontier (Della Malva 
and Santarelli, 2016). The possibilities to innovate for new entrant firms are therefore limited, 
which implies a negative impact of patents on the rate of new firm formation (Acs et al., 2009). 
It is also interesting to include copyright and its relationship with new firm formation in our 
cumulative measure of provisions concerning intellectual property rights. Traditionally, literature 
has disregarded it, since copyright typically protects literary, musical, artistic intellectual work. 
However, in most countries copyright protects computer software, and the software industry has 
been highly characterized by entry by start-ups (Zucker et al., 1998). Strong copyright protection 
has therefore encouraged on the one hand but limited on the other the development of new start-ups. 
The latter, negative effect is most likely to have bitten where small firms prospered by adapting 
existing software to the needs of other firms and private customers. 
Trademark is a form of intellectual property protection that has received little attention in 
the literature on entrepreneurship. A trademark “is a word, symbol, or other signifier used to 
distinguish a good or service produced by one firm from the goods or services of other firms” 
(Landes and Posner, 1987). Trademarks therefore help firms to differentiate their products, creating 
market niches and inducing customer loyalty. They also help reducing consumers search costs, by 
allowing firms to build a reputation for the quality of their goods and services. Clearly, such 
function requires the legal protection of trademarks. If competitors could use the word or symbol 
identifying a firm’s product or service freely, they could free ride on a firm’s investment in 
reputation building.
7
 Thus the impact of trademarks protection on entrepreneurship is positive. 
We hypothesize that provisions about intellectual property rights protection negatively 
impact entrepreneurship. Our sample in fact includes all new firms, operating in all sectors, highly 
innovative and not. As mentioned above, only highly innovative sectors tend to benefit from strong 
protection of intellectual property, as this allows full exploitation of investment in R&D. Other 
sectors are constrained by protection of intellectual property rights that prevents spillovers (Acs et 
a.l., 2009). Being non-innovative sectors the majority, we believe that in our sample negative 
effects prevail.
8
 Hence: 
                                                          
7 See Landes and Posner, 1987. 
8
 In order to analyze the impact of IPR’s on entrepreneurship, we could divide our sample per sectors, 
separating highly innovative sectors from other sectors. We should then observe a positive impact on the former sectors 
and a negative impact on the latter. This study is however beyond the scope of our paper and is left for future research. 
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H6: The protection of intellectual property rights in the constitution has a negative 
effect on the rate of new firm formation. 
Furthermore, we consider other institutional characteristics that might facilitate new firm 
formation. We analyze whether the explicit inclusion in the legal system of a provision protecting 
the right to a free and competitive market facilitates entrepreneurship. We consider whether the 
constitution mentions the right to establish and conduct a business. Both these rights should exert a 
positive impact on entrepreneurship. 
H7: The protection of market freedom and of the right to establish and conduct a 
business has a positive effect on entrepreneurship. 
Finally, we consider factors that should depress the rate of new firm formation. The right to 
strike should reduce productivity of firms, thus reducing entrepreneurship.  
The explicit mention of consumer protection should again have a negative impact, since in 
practice it is likely to force complex and costly warranty contracts and in general pushes firms to 
provide high quality. 
In general, all these provisions, like the provisions about environment protection can be 
considered as a regulatory burden imposed to firms in general and to new start-ups in particular. 
This is highly likely to reduce the rate of formation of new firms, as we argued in Section 2. 
Particularly, it is likely to limit the entry of new firms in legal sectors. As pointed out by Baumol 
(1990), too heavy regulation increase barriers to entry but this, rather than discourage entrepreneurs, 
determine their decision to remain in the gray sector. 
H8: Explicit constitutional protection of rights to strike and consumers rights 
negatively impact entrepreneurship. 
Another factor that is likely to have a negative impact on the rate of formation of new firms 
is corruption. In a very corrupt country it may be very costly to set up a new firm: bribes might be 
necessary to “oil the system”. Moreover, generally there is a positive correlation between the 
complexity of bureaucratic rules and the amount of red tape and corruption.
9
 If a constitution 
contains provisions regarding corruption, special attention is possibly devoted to contain its effects 
and to enforce anti-corruption measures. However, the measures of corruption control we consider 
regard the existence and the functioning of a counter-corruption commission.
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H9: The anti-corruption provisions in a constitution increase entrepreneurship. 
                                                          
9
See Mauro (1995) for the relationship between corruption and growth. Since entrepreneurship has been 
identified as one of the main engines of economic growth (see, among others, Baumol, 2010), a negative impact of 
corruption on entrepreneurship might be one of the channels explaining the negative impact of corruption on growth. 
10
 Within constitutions, corruption is mentioned together with other regulatory provisions. Therefore, 
provisions regarding corruption deal with regulatory burdens imposed to control bribery, grafts and other behavior by 
bureaucrats. 
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4. Data Description and Empirical Strategy 
The source of information about the characteristics of constitutions, our de jure determinants 
of entrepreneurship, is represented by the Comparative Constitutions Project: A Cross-National 
Historical Dataset of Written Constitutions (henceforth CCP) (Elkins et al., 2009), a repository of 
valuable data on the formal characteristics of written constitutions for most independent states since 
1789. Initially funded by the National Science Foundation and the Cline Center for Democracy at 
the University of Illinois, the CCP has subsequently (in 2013) developed into the Constitute project, 
a joint initiative with Google Ideas aimed at providing an indexed repository of constitutional text 
for every constitution currently in force. The CCP provides data on both form and content of 
constitutions and tracks their main revisions over time. It is divided into 14 sections, each of which 
dealing with general and specific provisions contained in a national constitution. For our analysis 
we used information from Sections 9.5 (Corruption), 13.5 (Economic Rights), 14.1 (Environment), 
14.5 (Economic Legislation), 14.6 (Race, Ethnicity, and Language), and 14.7 (Education).  
In relation to the variables aimed at capturing the effect of cultural, economic, and 
technological characteristics of a country on the overall process of new firm formation (our de facto 
determinants of entrepreneurship), we relied upon the World Bank Development Indicators, the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, and the Index of Economic Freedom. 
 
 
4.1 Dependent and independent variables 
Entrepreneurship capital involves a national milieu of agents who are willing to create new 
firms. Thus, a high rate of new firm formation may signal a greater endowment of entrepreneurship 
capital or a positive attitude towards self-employment. In the empirical literature on 
entrepreneurship, the rate of new firm formation and the endowment of entrepreneurship capital 
have been measured in different ways (for a survey, cf. Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). This 
literature has also shown that the employment of different measures of new firm formation may 
produce strikingly different results in empirical analyses. In particular, two alternative approaches 
can be adopted to compare start-up rates across different units of analysis (for a survey, see 
Santarelli et al., 2009): the ecological and the labor market approach.  
The ecological approach standardizes the number of entrants relative to that of active firms, 
the aim being to capture the magnitude of start-up activity in relation to the size of the existing 
population of businesses. Thus, this index can be viewed as the ratio between the founders of new 
firms and existing entrepreneurs. The labor market approach standardizes the number of new firms 
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with respect to the size of the workforce or working age population. It implicitly assumes that all 
firms are the result of individual actions, since new entrepreneurs can be viewed as individuals 
previously either having or being potentially interested in having a dependent job, who exploit their 
knowledge of production processes and market features to switch to independent work (Santarelli 
and Sterlacchini, 1994; Gries and Naudé, 2011). Accordingly, each individual in the labor pool is 
considered as a potential entrepreneur, with the potentiality to set up his own business (Audretsch 
and Fritsch, 1994). We believe that the labor market approach is the best way to study a country’s 
attitude towards entrepreneurship: in fact, we study individual private initiative and how it is 
influenced by the institutional framework, not industrial policy.  Accordingly, using data from the 
World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database
11
, the dependent variable is a standard measure of 
the total start-up activity in a country proxyied by new business density (NBD), i.e. the number of 
new business registrations (private, formal sector companies with limited liability) in every year in 
each country per 1,000 residents aged 15-64. Thus our measure is different from that employed by 
Acs et al. (2009), who used self-employed as a percentage of the labor force in their study of the 
relationship between knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurship in OECD countries. Our measures 
capture principles clearly stated in the constitutions, for each of which one or more proxies have 
been used. Since we only consider whether such principles are specifically introduced in the 
constitution, the corresponding variables are dummies attaining value 1 if the principle is mentioned 
in the constitution and zero otherwise. 
The independent variables are listed and described in Table 1. Given the panel nature of data 
it interesting to separate the "within" and "between" components of variance. Typically, 
constitutional changes are quite rare within a single country. Moreover, the longitudinal length of 
our dataset is relatively small (only one decade). Therefore, the variation in the regressors is almost 
entirely cross-sectional, and the within standard deviations of independent variables are quite small, 
nearly equal zero, which indicates their low variance over time. Thus, in our estimates, we will 
consider a cross-section of data averaging the variables that vary across time within each country. 
 
Table 1 - List of variables and their descriptive statistics: standard deviation is decomposed 
into between and within components 
 
Variable description Code Mean Std Min Max 
New Business density overall 
                                     between  
                                     within   
4.868 5.269 
5.038 
1.598 
0.0032 
0.027 
-4.644 
44.829 
35.318 
18.74 
Corruption     
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 Since the US economy is not covered by the database, we decided to exclude this country from analysis 
rather than extracting the relevant data from alternative sources. 
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Constitution contains provisions for a 
counter corruption commission 
                                    between 
                                    within 
corruption 0.065 
 
 
0.246 
 
0.224 
0.102 
0 
 
0 
-0.834 
1 
 
1 
0.898 
Economic legislation     
Adoption of national economic plans 
                                    between 
                                    within 
Economic 
plan 
0.187 0.391 
0.378 
0.096 
0 
0 
-0.712 
1 
1 
0.987 
Economic rights     
Right to transfer property freely 
                                   between 
                                   within 
Property 
transfer 
0.161 0.367 
0.359 
0.078 
0 
0 
-0.438 
1 
1 
1.061 
Inheritance rights 
                                  between 
                                  within    
Inheritance 0.297 0.457 
0.448 
0.098 
0 
0 
-0.602 
1 
1 
1.197 
Right to free/competitive markets 
                                  between 
                                  within 
Free market 0.208 0.406 
0.398 
0.083 
0 
0 
-0.691 
1 
1 
1.108 
Right to conduct/establish a business 
                                  between 
                                  within 
Business 0.376 0.484 
0.476 
0.096 
0 
0 
-0.523 
1 
1 
1.276 
Right to strike 
                                  between 
                                  within 
Strike 0.474 0.499 
0.492 
0.091 
0 
0 
-0.425 
1 
1 
1.374 
Consumer protection 
                                  between 
                                  within 
Consumer 
right 
0.218 0.413 
0.398 
0.114 
0 
0 
-0.681 
1 
1 
1.018 
Intellectual property rights  
                                  between 
                                  within 
Intellectual 
property right 
0.251 0.433 
0.422 
0.100 
0 
0 
-0.549 
1 
1 
1.151 
Environment     
Protection or preservation of the 
environment              between 
                                  within 
Environment 
protection 
0.754 0.431 
0.416 
0.111 
0 
0 
-0.145 
1 
1 
1.554 
Race, ethnicity, and language     
Provisions for national integration of 
ethnic communities,   between 
                                   within 
Ethnic 
integration 
0.210 0.407 
0.397 
0.094 
0 
0 
-0.689 
1 
1 
1.11 
Education     
Equal access to higher education 
                                   between 
                                   within 
Higher 
education 
0.260 0.438 
0.431 
0.083 
0 
0 
-0.639 
1 
1 
0.96 
To what level compulsory education 
                                    between 
                                    within 
Compulsory 
education 
0.499 0.636 
0.619 
0.149 
0 
0 
-0.701 
2 
2 
2.299 
Control variables     
Labor force participation rate (% of total 
population +15 years old) 
Labor force 62.188 10.937 30.5 89.6 
Government size: the ratio of public 
expenditure over GDP 
Government 
size 
16.285 7.999 2.047 104.9 
Percentage of internet users (reflecting 
infrastructure) 
Internet user 28.666 27.364 0.024 96.21 
GDP per capita (log) GDP capita 8.836 1.726 5.638 24.431 
De facto measures      
Corruption perception index CPI 4.104 2.081 1 9.7 
Economic freedom Eco freedom 59.484 11.251 1 89.4 
CO
2
 emission (tons per capita) CO2emis 4.961 7.136 0.018 61.989 
Gross intake ratio into primary education Gross intake 108.58 19.824 44.711 237.18 
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To control for country-specific characteristics that are likely to either stimulate or limit the 
endowment of entrepreneurship capital/new business density, we consider four general features of 
each country as control variables: 1) the labor force participation (for population aged 15+) (Labor 
force), under the assumption that since the largest fractions of new entrepreneurs is represented by 
individuals previously employed as wage workers, higher levels of this variable should be 
associated to higher rates of new business density (Storey and Jones, 1987); 2) the ratio of public 
expenditures over GDP (Government size), as a proxy of total tax pressure and the extent of 
regulatory interventions in the economy (Acs et al., 2009); 3) a measure of the quality of the 
infrastructures represented by the percentage of internet users (Internet user), to detect whether 
entrepreneurs do or do not start firms before a critical mass of a strategic infrastructure is 
accumulated; 4)  in order to shed light on the relationship between entrepreneurship and the 
business cycle, also GDP per capita (GDP capita) is added as a control variable. The measure of 
GDP per capita - converted into current international US Dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates - is drawn from the World Bank databases. To capture de facto characteristics of the countries 
that may facilitate the enforcement of the constitutional prescriptions that we are taking into 
account, we introduce four additional variables: i) the perceived level of corruption as reported by 
Transparency International (Cpi), as a measure of the potentially negative impact of the abuse of 
public or collective responsibility for private ends (Bardhan, 1997); ii) the gross intake ratio in first 
grade of primary education (gross intake; source: World Bank database), as a measure of the actual 
implementation of the right to education and of its impact on the formation of human capital; iii) the 
annual Index of Economic Freedom (Source: Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/index/) 
(Eco freedom), as a measure of the observance of the constitutional prescriptions aimed at 
guaranteeing the fundamental economic rights. The Index measures economic freedom on the basis 
of four pillars: rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency and open markets; and iv) the 
amount of carbon dioxide (CO
2
) in tons per capita (CO
2
emis, source: World Bank database), as a 
proxy of the actual enforcement of the constitutional prescriptions in relation to the protection of the 
environment.  
Looking at the correlation matrix in Table A2 in the Appendix, we select some interesting 
and possibly counterintuitive results. The economic freedom index is negatively correlated with the 
constitutional variables indicating the provision of an anti-corruption committee, the adoption of 
national economic plans, the right to strike. It is however surprisingly negatively correlated with the 
right to transfer property freely, with the right to establish a business and positively correlated with 
perceived corruption. The gross intake ratio in primary education is negatively correlated with the 
right to establish a business, with right to strike, with environmental protection and with the 
16 
 
corruption perception index. Finally, carbon dioxide emission per capita is negatively correlated 
with the right to establish a business, with the right to strike, with consumer protection and, 
unsurprisingly, with environment protection.  
To estimate the impact of constitutions on entrepreneurship, one has to recognize that 
institutional variables and entrepreneurship evolve jointly: not only do institutions affect 
entrepreneurship, but also entrepreneurship may affect institutions. For example, it may be that 
countries with poor entrepreneurial profile lack the resources to build effective social infrastructure. 
In order to address this issue of endogeneity, we need a source of exogenous variation in 
constitution. We follow prior studies to construct instrumental variables (IVs) for endogenous 
institutional variables in the four pillars of constitutions: corruption, economic rights, environment, 
and race, ethnicity and education. 
5. Model development 
To examine the quantitative importance of differences in constitutional factors as 
determinants of entrepreneurship across countries, we hypothesize the following structural model:  
(1)                     
where Y denotes net business density of country i in year t;     is constitutional variables of 
country i in year t;     is a set of other control variables;     is the usual error term.  
Before estimating the equation, the Breusch-Pagan’s test is employed to check for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. Thus, since the test confirms heteroskedasticity,
 12
 the alternative 
estimation technique capable of correcting for heteroskedastic errors by White’s method.  
We also conduct serial correlation and endogeneity tests to check for the presence of 
autocorrelation and endogenous variables, which would yield biased estimations for a panel data 
structure. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data indicates the presence of serial 
correlation in our dataset
13
. Although endogeneity bias usually arises in cross-sectional studies, it is 
rarely considered as a factor hindering economic analysis in the case of panel data estimations like 
ours, since fixed effects estimation would eliminate most forms of unobserved heterogeneity. In any 
case, the Sargan test has been used to check whether endogeneity is likely to bias our estimation. In 
                                                          
12  (1) = 641.85; p-value = 0.0000 
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F (1, 113) = 22.184; p-value=0.000 
17 
 
fact, the Sargan test indicates the presence of endogeneity of corruption, intellectual property right, 
free market.
14
 
Thus, several features of this framework deserve careful treatment. First, a constitution is 
endogenous. Economies are not exogenously endowed with the institutions and incentives that 
make up their entrepreneurial environment, but rather institutions are determined endogenously, 
perhaps influenced by the level of entrepreneurship in an economy. In this sense, robust pooled 
OLS estimation fails to give unbiased and efficient estimators, and instrumental variable two-staged 
least square (2SLS) could be a wise choice. However, since our data incur the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, we apply the IV generalized method of moments (GMM) technique which is 
suggested to give more reliable and consistent estimation results (Baum and Schaffer, 2003). The 
IV-GMM treatment requires the availability and validity of exogenous instruments that are 
correlated with the independent variables for which endogeneity has been detected, but that are 
uncorrelated with the measure of new business density. Second, our specification for the 
determination of entrepreneurship in equation (1) is parsimonious, reflecting our hypothesis that 
constitution is the primary and fundamental determinant of entrepreneurship. Although we try to 
control for various potential determinants in our control variables, it is naturally impossible to 
control for all the possible variables that might be correlated with our IVs and business density.  
For the sake of completeness, we estimate a robust pooled OLS model, a robust IV-GMM 
(that is our main specification) and, as a robustness check, a time-fixed effect OLS model. Given 
the rigidity in the constitutional modification processes and the relatively small longitudinal length 
of the dataset (only one decade), the first model is a regression with a cross section of data 
averaging the variables that vary across time within a country. Since the endogeneity test indicates 
the presence of endogeneity of three variables (corruption, intellectual property rights, and access to 
free market) at 1 percent significant level, the second model is a robust IV-GMM. Finally, to 
account for unobserved time-variant factors across countries, the third model is a time-fixed effect 
OLS.
 15
  
For IVs, we follow previous studies to obtain IVs for endogenous institutional variables. The 
under-identification and over-identification tests do support the reliability and validity of our 
selected IVs. First, following Acemoglu et al. (2001), we use “settler mortality rate” in countries 
                                                          
14  ( )                       
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 The F-test fails to support the joint significance of time dummies in the equation F(  9,   990) =    0.56, 
Prob > F =    0.8326. 
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colonized by Europeans.
16
 Their theory rests on three premises: (i) different types of colonization 
policies created different sets of institutions: ‘extractive states’ to exploit as much of the resources 
of the colony as possible and ‘neo-Europes’ to replicate European institutions; (ii) the colonization 
strategy was significantly influenced by the disease environment of the colony which caused high or 
low mortality rate; (iii) the colonial state and institutions persisted even after independence 
(reliability). They find out that the mortality rates faced by settlers more than 100 years ago explain 
over 25 percent of the variation in current institutions. The exclusion restriction test implied in our 
IV regression also suggests that indeed the mortality rates of European settlers more than 100 years 
ago have no effect on business density, other than their effect through institutional factors.
 17
 
Second, following Mauro (1995), we use an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization which 
measures the probability that two persons drawn at random from a country’s population will not 
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group as an instrument.
18
 The criteria for characterizing groups 
as ethnically separate related mainly to historical linguistic origin and no economic or political 
variables were considered in its construction. The higher the index, the more fragmented the 
country. In terms of reliability of the IV, a fragmented country may witness ethnic conflict, which 
potentially leads to political instability and corruption as bureaucrats may favor members of their 
same group. In terms of validity of the IV, the extent to which countries are fractionalized along 
ethnolinguistic lines is historic and exogenous by nature. 
Third, following Hall and Jones (1999), we use the geographical characteristics of an 
economy.
19
 Specifically, we use the distance from the equator. With respect to reliability, these 
characteristics measure the extent to which an economy is influenced by Western Europe, the first 
region of the world to implement broadly an institution favorable to entrepreneurship. Western 
Europeans were more likely to migrate to and settle in regions that were sparsely populated and 
broadly similar in climate to Western Europe, which points to regions far from equator. With 
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The first-stage reduced form regression indicates that “settler mortality rate” is significantly associated with 
corruption and free market competition. 
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 According to these authors, the development of political institutions around the world was influenced by 
the European legal system only in those countries in which the European themselves settled. This argument has been 
criticized by Djankov et al. (2003) and Glaeser et al. (2004). The latter, in particular, claim that the instrument used by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) to solve for the endogeneity of institutions is weak, being highly correlated with education 
(human capital) and being education a better instrument to explain institutional quality and economic growth. 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) defeat such criticism by showing that Glaeser et al. (2003) results reflect the recent worldwide 
increase in education and democracy. Simply controlling for time effects in the regression greatly reduces the impact of 
education on institutions. Further robustness checks for the performance of settler mortality rate as instrument in 
explaining institutions is provided by Acemoglu et al. (2012). 
18
The first-stage reduced form regression indicates the significance of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 
explaining free market/competition and corruption. 
19
The first-stage reduced form regression indicates the significance of latitude in explaining property rights 
and corruption. 
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respect to validity, Europeans sought to exploit areas of the world that were rich in natural resources 
and valuable commodities, rather than searching for places with rich entrepreneurial opportunities. 
On the other hand, there is no tendency today for these areas to have richer entrepreneurial climate 
than other regions. The distance from the equator as the absolute value of latitude in degrees 
divided by 90 to place it on a 0 to 1 scale, is obtained from the Global Demography Project at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara (Tobler et al., 1995). 
Finally, we also use as an instrument the variable constructed by Frankel and Romer (1996): 
the (log) predicted trade share of an economy, based on a gravity model of international trade that 
only uses a country’s population and geographical features.20 On the one hand, their findings show 
that geographic features account for a major part of the variation in market openness: the extent to 
which countries can access to each other’s market. On the other hand, geographic features are 
determined by nature, and should have nothing to do with impeding or inducing start-ups.  
We use over-identification tests to detect whether our IVs have a direct effect on business 
density. The results are encouraging for our approach, and thus our exclusion restriction is plausible 
(see Table 3).   
6. Empirical results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of our estimates and compares them with the theoretical 
hypotheses formulated in Section 3. 
Looking at the results of the estimates more in detail, from Table 3 we observe the 
consistency in the general pattern of estimation results obtained from all the estimated models: the 
time-average OLS, the IV-GMM and the time-fixed effect. 
Controlling for endogeneity in the IV-GMM estimation, we still find that differences in 
constitutions across countries account for much of the difference in fostering entrepreneurship 
around the world. It is hard to escape the conclusion that differences in institutions and government 
policies play a key role in generating the wide variation in entrepreneurship across countries. 
Particularly, the provisions for a counter corruption commission, constitutional protection of 
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The first-stage reduced form regression indicates the significance of the predicted trade share in explaining 
property rights and corruption. 
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free/competitive markets, right to establish a business, right to strike, and higher levels of 
compulsory education are all factors enhancing the propensity to start up new businesses.
21
 
Conversely, prescriptions for national economic plans, constitutional protection of 
inheritance rights and of intellectual property rights, the preservation of the environment, and equal 
access to higher education are associated to lower levels of new business density.
22
 
Table 2: Theoretical hypotheses and results 
VARIABLES HYPOTHESES 
(Sign of impact on new firm formation) 
RESULTS 
Higher education 
H1 
+ - 
Compulsory education + + 
Ethnic integration H2 + + insignificant 
Economic plan H3 - - 
Environment protection H4 - - 
Property transfer 
H5 
+ + insignificant 
Inherit + - insignificant 
IPRs H6 - - 
Free market 
H7 
+ + 
Right to Establish Business + + 
Strike 
H8 
- + 
Consumer right - + insignificant 
Counter Corruption Comm. H9 + + 
 
In general, the majority of our hypotheses are supported, as Table 2 shows, with some 
interesting exceptions. In fact, looking first at the group of variables dealing with education, 
hypothesis H1 posits that provisions regarding education have a positive impact on the rate of new 
business formation. We find instead that, while constitutional guarantees of equal access to higher 
education are found to inhibit entrepreneurship, higher compulsory educational levels nurture 
entrepreneurial efforts. Compulsory educational levels here range from primary school to high 
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 Although positive, the coefficient of the right to establish a business variable is non- statistically significant 
in the OLS and in the time-FE estimate. 
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 Although negative, the coefficients of inheritance rights are non-statistically significant in the OLS and in 
the time-FE model, whereas the coefficient of IPR’s is non-statistically significant in the time-FE model. In turn, the 
coefficient of equal access to higher education is negative and barely statistically significant in the OLS model and 
negative but non-statistically significant in the year-FE model.  
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school, which provide basic knowledge and skills to citizens. Basic knowledge obviously is vital to 
deal with business start-up and its related risks. Numerous empirical studies support the stimulating 
effect of education on entrepreneurship (Van Praag, 2005; Santarelli and Tran, 2013). Since most 
countries make education compulsory up to secondary/intermediate level, we are dealing with a 
level of compulsory education that certainly impacts positively on individual skills and has little if 
any signaling/screening power. However, equal access to higher education reflects voluntary efforts 
to proceed to graduate and post-graduate education. In this sense, it also implies a higher 
opportunity cost for entrepreneurs: they may not be willing to sacrifice stable and well-paid jobs to 
take over risky ventures. These findings therefore provide support to the theories presented in 
Section 3. 
Turning to our hypothesis H2, we find that constitutional provisions regarding ethnic 
integration do not have a statistically significant impact on the rate of new business formation in the 
IV-GMM, while they have a positive impact in the time-fixed effect treatment. Hypothesis H2 is 
therefore only marginally supported. 
As for economic legislation, countries which are forced by their constitutions to adopt 
national economic plans are the least entrepreneurially active, confirming our hypothesis H3. It 
seems that centrally planned economies are less able to provide incentives to business founders and 
are generally characterized by slower entrepreneurial dynamics than free market economies. 
Consistently with the large and positive coefficient of the free competitive market – showing that 
pro-market institutional arrangements promote entrepreneurship - the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of national economic plan confirms that when institutions do not support 
economic freedom entrepreneurship is severely impeded (Bell et al., 2008; Parker, 2009, Ch. 15). 
Furthermore, provisions about the protection or preservation of the environment do not facilitate 
entrepreneurship, which confirms our Hypothesis H4. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of the preservation of environment variable suggests that new firms are less capable to 
face the increased costs brought in by strict environmental regulations.  
We then turn to the variables defining economic rights in our dataset. While variables 
proxying provisions about the right to transfer property freely never get a statistically significant 
coefficient, inheritance rights are found to exert a statistically significant negative impact in our IV-
GMM. Then our hypothesis H5 cannot be confirmed. Our results indirectly support the view that 
the transition problem often facing entrepreneurial/family firms cannot be overcome by simply 
regulating transfers of property, since it is also linked to cultural (e.g. business founders reluctance 
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to hand over control of their firm to an outsider) and structural (e.g. inefficiency of financial 
markets) factors (Burkart et al., 2003).  
Less straightforward results are found for the provisions concerning the protection of 
intellectual property rights, here consisting of patents, copyright and trademarks. Particularly, 
intellectual property rights have a strong and negative impact on the rate of new business formation. 
The coefficient is statistically significant at a 99% confidence interval in all models but the year-FE 
OLS. When we break down the property right variable into 3 separate components and re-estimate 
equation (1), we found the significant and positive effect of trademarks on stimulating firm entries 
while the other two components (copyright and patents) remain negative
23
. This implies that 
registrations of new brand names (new varieties of a product) are the preferred instrument for the 
protection of intellectual property rights by new firms outside high-tech industries. In the law and 
economics literature, trademarks have been shown to be a “signal” which facilitates and enhances 
consumers’ decisions and creates incentives for firms to produce goods of desirable qualities 
(Landes and Posner, 1987; Economides, 1998). Trademarks are also a standard measure of the 
innovative performance of firms in traditional and intermediate industries, i.e. in industries in which 
the rate of new firm formation tends to be higher (cf. Mendonça et al., 2004). However, since most 
of the technological activities that are likely to lead agents to apply for either patent or copyright 
protection are undertaken by a limited number of large firms in specific industries, copyright and 
patents may not adequately reflect technological opportunities available to (very) small new firms 
(Santarelli et al., 2009). In fact, as a comment to their finding that patent activity is negatively 
associated to new firm formation in the USA, Choi and Phan (2006) argue that patents are an 
indicator of venture success rather than a cause of firm formation.  
The right to establish / conduct a business leads to higher rates of entrepreneurship in our 
IV-GMM treatment (but not in the OLS models). The provisions denoted by this right are typical of 
institutional settings aimed at protecting entrepreneurs from the risk of appropriation, which 
confirms our hypothesis H7. Consistently, the variable free competitive market is also statistically 
significant and positive. A free and competitive market obviously creates a favorable business 
environment and level playing field to both incumbent and nascent entrepreneurs. The coefficient of 
the right to strike variable is also positive and significant, which surprisingly contradicts hypothesis 
H8.
24
 This might be due to the fact that strikes tend to occur in large companies more than in small 
ones, where industrial relations are based on personal and close interaction and family bonds and 
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 Estimation results can be obtained from the authors. 
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 Significance is at the 99% confidence level in all three model specifications. 
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friendship often ties workers and ownership. Moreover, the fact that a constitution mentions the 
right to strike implies that ordinary laws will probably clearly regulate strikes, which renders 
industrial relations generally more transparent and less costly to manage.
25
 
 Consumer protection is negative, albeit insignificant (only in the year-FE it is negative and 
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level). The main explanation for this finding might be 
that although an economy with consumer protection is characterized by high consumer trust and 
little incidence of lemons problems (Akerlof, 1970; Landes and Posner, 1985), the costs to manage 
customer relationships to prevent any legal issues are obviously high, which requires firms to focus 
more on costly market research before starting up new ventures and to set up costly warranty 
contracts. This certainly deteriorates the survival of new firms and makes entry and 
entrepreneurship in general more challenging. 
As expected, provisions for a counter-corruption commission play a crucial role in fostering 
a highly entrepreneurial climate within the country, which confirms H9. Corruption has been 
always cited as the strongest impediment to business environment and national economic growth 
(Mauro, 1995).  
Of the four control variables, GDP per capita only is always positive and statistically 
significant (although just at a 95% confidence level in the IV-GMM treatment). On the one side, 
this is consistent with the findings by many empirical studies and confirms that, on the aggregate 
level, GDP cycles do predict the entrepreneurial cycle. High GDP per capita reflects stronger 
demands, which leads to abundance of emerging entrepreneurial opportunities, and in turn induces 
new entries to capture such opportunities (Santarelli and Tran, 2013). On the other side, it suggests 
that a higher ratio of public expenditure over GDP may create a more favorable environment (e.g. 
through subsidies and tax breaks) for new start-ups. 
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 Another possible explanation might rely in the positive relationship that the regulation and protection of 
the rights to strike has with democracy. Thus, the protection of the right to strike is a consequence of good democratic 
institutions, which in turn cause good economic outcomes.  This second explanation however seems to be weakened by 
the lack of correlation between the Index of Economic Freedom and the right to strike variable (correlation between the 
two variables is a statistically insignificant -0.03). In fact, one of the components of the Index of Economic Freedom is 
rule of law. Democracy and rule of law seem to go hand in hand, at least in constitutional states (see Habermas, 1995). 
Then, according to our data, the better the rule of law, the less likely it is that the right to strike is mentioned in the 
constitution. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of the Constitutions and Entrepreneurship  
 
 Dependent variable: New Business Density 
Variables 
OLS with time average 
variables
26
 
IV-GMM with robust  
standard errors
27
 
Year-FE
28
 
Coefficient Robust SE 
 
Coefficient Robust SE  Coefficient Robust SE 
Corruption        
Counter corruption commission 2.554 0.294*** 13.276 5.38***  4.493 0.267*** 
Economic legislation        
National economic plan -1.999 0.146*** -1.367 0.651**  -1.779 0.195*** 
Economic rights        
Transfer property freely 0.242 0.261 0.177 0.572  0.239 0.321 
Inheritance right -0.058 0.149 -2.127 1.021**  -0.189 0.212 
Free competitive market 3.872 0.216*** 5.809 2.981**  3.955 0.229*** 
Right to establish a business 0.110 0.223 1.229 0.538**  0.235 0.347 
Right to strike 0.531 0.182*** 3.319 0.677***  1.799 0.305*** 
Consumer protection -0.046 0.172 -0.324 1.107  -0.441 0.238* 
Intellectual property rights -0.689 0.169*** -7.762 2.283***  -0.165 0.218 
Environment        
Preservation of environment -2.09 0.266*** -3.635 0.593***  -3.466 0.408*** 
Race, ethnicity & language        
Integration of ethnic communities 0.077 0.168 0.662 0.458  0.4381 0.168** 
Education        
Equal access to higher education -0.352 0.194* -1.91 0.702***  -0.432 0.313 
Compulsory educational level 0.993 0.140*** 1.496 0.386***  0.561 0.151*** 
Control variables        
Labor force participation rate -0.008 0.002*** -0.012 0.023  -0.021 0.009** 
                                                          
26
Given the rigidity in constitutional modification processes and the relatively small longitudinal length of the dataset, the variation in the regressors of interest is almost entirely 
cross-sectional. Thus we consider a cross section of data averaging the variables that vary across time within a country. 
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 Since at least two instruments should vary over time (ethnolinguistic fractionalization and trade share of the economy), the IV GMM model could overcome the time invariance 
in the regressors of interest.  
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 As a robustness check, we consider year-FE to account for unobserved time-variant factors across countries. This is particularly crucial given that the time span considered 
includes years both before and after the 2008 financial crisis.  
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Government size 0.003 0.012 0.062 0.019***  0.064 0.011*** 
Percentage of internet users 0.031 0.005*** 0.017 0.012  0.003 0.007 
GDP capita 0.326 0.089*** 0.296 0.146**  0.146 0.058*** 
De facto  variables        
Corruption perception index (CPI) 1.055 0.082*** 0.282 0.174*  0.087 0.014*** 
Economic freedom 0.008 0.004** 0.066 0.037*  0.009 0.004** 
CO
2
 emission (tons per capita) -0.079 0.015*** -0.054 0.052  -0.004 0.014 
Gross intake ratio in primary 
education 
0.011 0.001*** 0.008 0.005*    
Year 2005      0.281 0.388 
Year 2006      0.456 0.427 
Year 2007      0.854 0.482* 
Year 2008      0.504 0.443 
Year 2009      0.092 0.399 
Year 2010      0.258 0.421 
Year 2011      0.458 0.431 
Year 2012      0.635 0.445 
Year 2013      0.629 0.446 
Intercept 1.969 0.892** -4.533 3.081  -7.465 1.227*** 
F 
(21, 1951) = 123.36 
p-value = 0.000 
(21,1107)=16.58 
p-value=0.000 
 (30,1099) = 67.8 
p-value=0.000 
R-squared 0.5105    0.5142 
Under-identification test 
    ( )=13.332 
p-value=0.001 
   
Over-identification test (Hansen J 
statistic) 
    ( )=0.508 
p-value=0.476 
   
Endogeneity test 
    ( )=16.542 
p-value=0.000 
   
Observations 1973  1129  1130 
 
Note: *: significant at 90% level; **: significant at 95% level; ***: significant at 99% level. 
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The rate of labor force participation gets a negative sign in all the three treatments although 
the coefficient is not statistically significant in the IV-GMM treatment and is significant only at the 
95% confidence level in the year-FE one. Since we give priority to the IV-GMM model in 
interpreting our results, we do not advance any theoretical implications for this. The coefficient of 
the government size variable is always positive although statistically significant (at the 99% level) 
only in the IV-GMM and the year-FE models. The positive impact of an increase in tax pressure 
and regulatory burden might imply a shift from large to small firms.
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Finally, quality of infrastructure has a positive impact, although non-statistically significant 
in the year-FE treatment and significant only at a 90% confidence level in the IV-GMM one. The 
interpretation is straightforward.  
Finally, three of our four de facto variables are statistically significant in all the three 
treatments (at least at a 90% confidence level)  and are found to exert a positive impact on the rate 
of new business formation. The statistically significant and positive coefficient of the corruption 
perception index (although only at a 90% confidence level in the IV-GMM) might be surprising, 
given that provisions for an anti-corruption committee also have a positive impact. However, the 
two variables are not correlated (a statistically insignificant -0.05, from Table A2 in the Appendix). 
Thus, an anti-corruption committee might foster economic activity, reducing the costs of starting a 
new business and possibly shifting investment from small to large firms, usually more likely to 
become prey for corrupt officers. At the same time, however, in countries where the  social 
acceptance of entrepreneurial activities is high, lower levels of corruption do not necessarily result 
in higher rates of new firm formation but the opposite might hold true (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009).
30
 In this case, investments are likely to shift from large to small businesses. 
Moreover, economic freedom and gross intake into primary education have a positive 
impact (although both only at a 90% confidence level in the IV-GMM). The impact of economic 
freedom is in line with the effect of constitutional variables promoting economic rights. The 
positive effect of the gross intake into primary education confirms the positive impact of 
constitutional provisions dealing with compulsory education. Since the CO
2
 emissions variable gets 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient only in the OLS treatment, whereas it is 
insignificant in the other two estimates, we may simply argue that poorer and less developed 
                                                          
29
 This result differs from Acs et al (2009). Besides considering a different measure for entrepreneurship, as 
mentioned in Section 4.1, they also limit their analysis to a set of 19 OECD countries, where tax rates are likely to be 
fair compared to other “extractive” economies in developing countries. The tendency to “stay small” to avoid 
expropriation might be particularly strong among the latter. 
30
 In fact, one may argue that culturally-based characteristics of a country may well explain a number of 
observed economic phenomena (cf. Guiso et al., 2006). 
27 
 
countries which are typically the ones with higher emissions are likely to be endowed with less 
entrepreneurship capital. 
 
7. Robustness analysis 
To control for possible specification errors, country fixed effects and omitted variables, we 
conduct a further sensitivity analysis. Rather than adding or removing regressors,
31
 we re-estimate 
our model for the European countries alone (Table 4). The idea here is that, since constitutions were 
first adopted and fully implemented in Europe, the impact of their provisions on economic activity 
in general and entrepreneurship in particular should be even more stable than elsewhere.
32
 In 
general, the regression coefficients of all the three treatments (time-average OLS, IV-GMM, and 
year FE) estimated for European countries alone were consistent with those for the whole sample of 
115 countries. 
Counter-corruption provision is dropped from the regression due to collinearity. All 
European countries appear not to have corruption provisions in their constitutions. In general, 
consistent with the analysis performed for all the 115 countries included in our database, we can 
observe consistent positive effects of constitutional provisions regarding right to establish a 
business, right to strike, and compulsory educational level (although the latter only at a 90% 
confidence level); as well as negative effect of preservation of environment, and equal access to 
higher education. However, intellectual property rights seem to exert an opposite impact on 
business density for European countries although they are just marginally statistically significant 
only in the year fixed effects treatment. Provisions regulating the protection of intellectual property 
are therefore found not to impede new start-ups in Europe. This is likely due to the fact that these 
constitutional provisions were first and fully enforced in European countries, which are endowed 
with more developed institutional and economic infrastructure. Thus IPRs are relatively more 
established and stronger in exposing their fundamental benefits and enable start-ups in Europe to 
reap full rewards from their emerging innovations without the fear of free-riding risks.   
  
                                                          
31
 We have also performed that type of analysis, and results are very robust (estimations are available upon 
request from the authors). 
32
 For this reason, we decided not to use other, more artificial and heterogeneous aggregations, such as the 
OECD countries. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of the Constitutions and Entrepreneurship (European countries only)  
Dependent variable: New Business Density 
Variables 
Time-average OLS  IV-GMM   Year-FE 
Coefficient Robust SE 
 
Coefficient Robust SE  Coefficient Robust SE 
Economic legislation        
National economic plan -3.101 0.665*** -0.252 0.694  -0.358 0.538 
Economic rights        
Transfer property freely 0.161 0.504 0.547 1.052  0.396 0.552 
Inheritance right -0.002 0.389 -0.371 1.113  -0.886 0.386** 
Free competitive market 1.671 0.612*** 2.436 2.538  1.515 0.502*** 
Right to establish a business 2.736 0.704*** 2.539 0.679***  1.815 0.771** 
Right to strike 6.661 1.053*** 3.703 0.739***  5.058 0.934*** 
Consumer protection -0.115 0.595 -0.707 0.716  -0.618 0.506 
Intellectual property rights 0.495 0.487 2.671 2.33  0.825 0.432* 
Environment        
Preservation of environment -7.72 0.625*** -6.989 0.753***  -6.847 0.746*** 
Race, ethnicity & language        
Integration of ethnic comm. 1.126 0.347*** 0.383 0.42  0.805 0.333** 
Education        
Equal access to higher educ. -4.039 0.621*** -4.041 1.016***  -3.367 0.732*** 
Compulsory educational level 1.646 0.321*** 0.974 0.552*  1.828 0.354*** 
Control variables        
Labor force participation rate -0.084 0.026*** -0.052 0.036  -0.047 0.024** 
Government size 0.042 0.067 0.139 0.086  0.136 0.043*** 
Percentage of internet users 0.097 0.025*** 0.003 0.012  0.014 0.026 
GDP capita 0.707 0.262*** 0.014 0.626  0.554 0.316* 
De facto measures        
Corruption perception index 3.26 0.495*** 0.158 0.229  0.068 0.253 
Economic freedom 0.102 0.027*** 0.119 0.058**  0.171 0.039*** 
CO
2
 emission -0.263 0.074*** -0.049 0.074  -0.091 0.077 
Gross intake ratio 0.023 0.005*** 0.005 0.005  0.006 0.005 
Year dummies      F (9,390) = 0.75 
Intercept 12.704 2.529*** -6.174 3.818  -16.41 4.404*** 
F (20, 483) = 46.09*** (20, 399)=21.56***  (29, 390) = 15.53*** 
R-squared 0.5962    0.5378 
Under-identification test     ( )=22.63***    
Endogeneity test     ( )=11.04***    
Observations 504  420  420 
Note: *: significant at 90% level; **: significant at 95% level; ***: significant at 99% level.  
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This leads to the consideration that IPRs and, more generally, rights included in 
constitutions, generally originated in Europe (particularly Western Europe) and are therefore likely 
to be fully enforced there. Conversely, developing countries often imported such rights in a process 
of legal transplantation (see Mattei, 1997 and Sacco, 1991). This renders their enforcement more 
problematic and uncertain, for transplanted legal rules might be at odds with other existing legal 
statutes and be even seen as a threat to the legal culture and history of a country. The social and 
political costs of enforcement might then be prohibitive. Legal traditions may be so far apart from 
each other that society would simply resist the new transplanted rule (see Legrand, 1997; Carbonara 
and Parisi, 2007). In such a case we might even witness a “countervailing effect” (Carbonara et al., 
2012) of the transplanted rule, where the introduction of intellectual property might lead to less de 
facto protection, with a negative impact on both non-innovative entrepreneurship (for the reasons 
explained above) and innovative entrepreneurship (now paradoxically less protected). 
Besides, several authors (including Posner, 2005) have suggested that IP protection has been 
overstretched, with the consequence that it produces negative results. Developing or recently 
developed countries might be more sensitive to institutional arrangements and to their changes (see 
Desai et al., 2005, showing that Central and Eastern European countries are significantly more 
sensitive to institutional arrangements than more mature Western European ones). An extremely 
strong protection in countries still far from the technological frontier might have a very large, 
negative impact that is not observed in more mature and less sensitive economies. 
The two control variables which exhibited a positive and significant coefficient in the IV-
GMM treatment for all countries (GDP per capita and Government size) turn out to be insignificant 
when we limit our analysis to European countries alone. This suggests that a) in countries where 
GDP per capita is generally high, higher values of this ratio are associated to a more concentrated 
industrial structure which is likely to bring about also higher entry barriers; b) above a certain 
threshold increases in the ratio of public expenditure over GDP might create overall conditions less 
favorable to new firm formation. Possibly, such effects in European countries are not so strong to 
reverse the sign of the coefficients, but enough to counteract the positive effects experienced in 
other, less wealthy countries. 
As far as our de facto variables are concerned, the main differences with respect to the 
analysis performed for all the 115 countries is that the corruption perception index and the gross 
intake ratio in primary education are non-statistically significant in the IV-GMM treatment. These 
findings are probably indication that corruption and school dropout rates are less severe problems in 
Europe than they are in the developing countries. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
This paper has provided evidence supporting the view that constitutions may influence the 
behavior of economic agents. Dealing with the issue of the institutional determinants of 
entrepreneurship and using both de jure and de facto measures, it has shown a) that some of the 
provisions contained in national constitutions that create favorable conditions for entrepreneurship 
are positively and significantly associated to a standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics such 
as the rate of new business density, and b) that other provisions which may be likely to impose a 
burden on or to just limit entrepreneurial freedom are negatively and statistically significantly 
associated to new business density.  
In addition to a positive analysis, our findings may also have a normative function. We 
identified some of the principles that constitutions should include when fostering a high 
entrepreneurial dynamics is a priority. Particularly, for a counter corruption commission, 
constitutional protection of free/competitive markets, right to establish a business, right to strike, 
and higher levels of compulsory education promote higher rates of new firm formation and should 
therefore be given high stance. 
The different findings concerning the impact of provisions dealing with protection of 
intellectual property rights in Europe and in the whole sample provides an interesting path for 
future research. Such research would explore the effect of IPRs in different sectors, looking at the 
impact in high tech industries as compared to less innovative ones, where imitation and spillovers 
are likely to be more important. It would also try to understand the theoretical and empirical reasons 
behind the positive association between stronger protection of IPRs and entrepreneurship in 
countries with older constitutions and more certain enforcement (Europe). Finally, it would deal 
with the different effect exerted on entrepreneurship by provisions dealing with each of the three 
main types of IPRs protection. 
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Appendix 1 – List of countries33 
Canada; Dominican Republic; Jamaica; Mexico; Belize; Guatemala; El Salvador; Costa Rica; Panama; 
Colombia; Peru; Brazil; Bolivia; Chile; Argentina; Uruguay; United Kingdom; Ireland; Netherlands; Belgium; 
Luxembourg; France; Switzerland; Spain; Portugal; Germany; Poland; Austria; Hungary; Czech Republic; Slovak 
Republic; Italy; Malta; Albania; Montenegro; Macedonia; Croatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Slovenia; Greece; 
Cyprus; Bulgaria; Moldova; Romania; Russia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Ukraine; Belarus; Armenia; Georgia; 
Azerbaijan; Finland; Sweden; Norway; Denmark; Iceland; Niger; Burkina Faso; Sierra Leone; Ghana; Togo; 
Nigeria; Gabon; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda; Kenya; Rwanda; Ethiopia; Zambia; Malawi; South 
Africa; Namibia; Lesotho; Botswana; Madagascar; Mauritius; Morocco; Algeria; Tunisia; Turkey; Iraq; Egypt; 
Syria; Jordan; Israel; Qatar; United Arab Emirates; Oman; Tajikistan; Kyrgyz Republic; Kazakhstan; South Korea; 
Japan; India; Bhutan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Sri Lanka; Maldives; Nepal; Thailand; Cambodia; Laos; Malaysia; 
Singapore; Brunei; Philippines; Indonesia; Timor; Australia; New Zealand; Vanuatu; Tonga. 
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 The World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database covers 132 countries, but for 17 of them information 
on either the constitution or the control variables was not available. They have therefore been dropped from analysis. 
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Table A.2 – Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 1.000                      
2 0.12* 1.000                     
3 -0.24* -0.03 1.000                    
4 0.04 0.06* 0.03 1.000                   
5 0.01 -0.03 0.21* 0.13* 1.000                  
6 0.29* -0.02 0.02 0.15* 0.27* 1.000                 
7 -0.01 -0.06* 0.05 0.11* 0.26* 0.29* 1.000                
8 -0.003 -0.12* 0.17* 0.15* 0.12* 0.37* 0.36* 1.000               
9 0.04 -0.03 0.24* 0.13* 0.14* 0.43* 0.21* 0.38* 1.000              
10 0.12* -0.15* 0.09* 0.05* 0.04 0.24* 0.15* 0.2* 0.29* 1.000             
11 -0.27* 0.05 0.12* 0.09* 0.16* 0.23* 0.32* 0.38* 0.27* 0.15* 1.000            
12 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.07* 0.12* 0.24* 0.21* 0.11* 0.17* 0.11* 0.21* 1.000           
13 -0.02 -0.03 0.15* 0.08* 0.07* 0.2* 0.31* 0.26* 0.2* 0.06* 0.21* 0.05 1.000          
14 -0.01 -0.09* 0.21* 0.07* 0.23* 0.26* 0.19* 0.44* 0.27* 0.25* 0.36* 0.22* 0.25* 1.000         
15 0.41* -0.05 -.15* -0.07* -0.06 -0.04 -0.17* -0.22* -0.12* -0.01 -0.32 -0.05 -0.03 -0.15* 1.000        
16 0.00 0.12* 0.04 0.15* -0.05 -0.02 -0.09* 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.17* 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.05 1.000       
17 0.12* -0.05 -0.04 0.1* -0.02 -0.02 -0.09* -0.06* -0.01 -0.06* -0.04 -0.09* -0.01 -0.14* 0.19* -0.12* 1.000      
18 0.42* -0.07* -.18* -0.09* 0.04 0.07* -0.08* -0.09* -0.01 0.05 -0.2* 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.81* -0.02 0.14* 1.000     
19 0.26* 0.07* -.12* -0.07* 0.04 0.07* -0.05 -0.11* -0.00 0.01 -0.09* -0.03 -0.02 0.06* 0.41* -0.11* 0.04 0.48* 1.000    
20 0.47* -0.1* -.25* -0.1* -0.06* 0.1* -0.08* -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.25* 0.03 -0.04 -0.07* 0.74* 0.04 0.03 0.69* 0.32* 1.000   
21 0.08* 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.11* -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.11* -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 1.000  
22 0.12* 0.06* -.14* -0.04 0.07* -0.01 -0.11* -0.21* -0.07* -0.06* -0.11* -0.03 -0.09* -0.02 0.36* 0.03 0.03 0.53* 0.39* 0.31* 0.02 1.000 
*: significant at 1% level 
 
List of variables: 1) business density; 2) counter-corruption; 3) national economic plan; 4) property transfer; 5) inheritance; 6) free market 7) right to establish a business; 8)  right 
to strike; 9) consumer protection; 10) property right; 11) environment protection; 12) ethnic integration; 13) access to higher education 14) compulsory educational level; 15) 
corruption perception index (CPI);16) laborforce; 17) government size;18) internet users; 19) GDP per capita; 20) economic freedom index; 21) gross intake ratio in primary 
education; 22) carbon dioxide emission per capita. 
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Table A.3: Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
34
 
 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
VIF 1.13 1.39 1.22 1.43 1.7 1.64 2.12 1.72 1.22 1.8 1.23 1.59 1.55 5.07 1.36 1.24 3.94 1.69 3.96 1.1 1.72 
Tolerance 0.88 0.71 0.81 0.7 0.58 0.61 0.47 0.58 0.81 0.55 0.81 0.62 0.64 0.16 0.73 0.8 0.25 0.59 0.25 0.91 0.58 
 
List of variables: 1) business density; 2) counter-corruption; 3) national economic plan; 4) property transfer; 5) inheritance; 6) free market 7) right to establish a business; 8)  right 
to strike; 9) consumer protection; 10) property right; 11) environment protection; 12) ethnic integration; 13) access to higher education 14) compulsory educational level; 15) 
corruption perception index (CPI);16) labor force; 17) government size;18) internet users; 19) GDP per capita; 20) economic freedom index; 21) gross intake ratio into primary 
education; 22) carbon dioxide emission per capita. 
 
 
                                                          
34 Examining the tolerances of  VIFs is probably superior to examining the bivariate correlations. A commonly used rule of thumb is that VIFs of 10 or higher (or equivalently, 
tolerances of 0.1 or less) may be reason for concern (see, among several others, O’Brien, 2007). Looking at our collinearity statistics, none of the variables has VIF greater than 6 
and their tolerances are all above 0.1. Thus, collinearity should not be a serious problem for our analysis. However, some authors (albeit a minority) suggest that the tolerance 
threshold for VIF is 5 (Rogerson, 2001) or even 4 (Pan and Jackson, 2008). A clear and universally accepted criterion has not been indicated so far. Following Wooldridge (2013, 
p. 99) one may therefore conclude that “setting a cutoff value for VIF above which we conclude multicollinearity is a ‘problem’ is arbitrary and not especially useful”.   
